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Porterfield: Contempt--Interference with Receiverships
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
CONTEMPT-INTERFERENCM

WITH RECEIVERSHIPs.-It

has

been contended that when a court manages a business
through a receiver, it is not exercising purely judicial functions, but administrative functions, and ought not to be permitted to use the summary proceeding in contempt as in a
trial.' This observation is made upon a case in which a
federal judge sentenced the comptroller of the City of New
York for contempt. The judge had appointed one receiver
for a transit company in which the city was interested. The
comptroller had petitioned the judge to be appointed a coreceiver; in a letter written to the receiver, duly appointed,
the defendant charged that the judge was responsible for a
policy of denying the writer and certain other parties any
access to the original sources of information concerning the
property and affairs of the company. The judge, upon see-2
ing this letter, held defendant guilty of contempt of court.
But on appeal, this decision was reversed on these grounds;
(1) that defendant was not guilty of misbehavior in or so
near the presence of the court as to obstruct the administration of justice-an essential element required by the Judicial Code, §268, (Comp. St., §1245); (2) there was not
pending sub judice a proceeding before the court at the
time the letter was written. 3 However, the question is presented; should the power of contempt process be available
when! the court in a receivership case acts in an administrative capacity? It is assumed that this power is proper in
cases involving contempt when the court performs judicial
functions.
A diligent search has revealed a paucity of authority on
the subject. A few cases have been found to the effect
that when a judge is acting in the performance of ministerial duties libelous publications, are not a contempt of court.
In one case, 4 a state statute required a judge of a county
court to keep an account of his fees and emoluments. The
appellate court said: "This duty and this responsibility are
ministerial. There is no room for the exercise of discretion
or of judgment, except in minor details of performance."
It was held that such judge had no power to punish for con-

' See:

"Our Courts and Free Speech," HARPER'S MONTHLY, eptember, 1927.
2 Ex parte Craig, 266 Fed. 230 (1920).
Ez parte Craig, 274 Fed. 177 (1921).
Hamma v. People, 42 Col. 40; 94 Pac. 326; 15 L. R. A. N. S. 621 (1908).
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tempt one who criticized the method of keeping these accounts. It would seem, however, that in this case, the
county court was not a judicial court at all, but merely an
administrative body. So the like distinguishing feature is
applicable to the case5 wherein one of the justices Qf a
county court offered to the court protests against appropriations about to be made to pay for the erection of certain county buildings, and, among other things, was a statement that the county court had transcended the authority
given it by law. Held, the justice was not guilty of contempt. No reasons were assigned. In another case,0 a justice of the peace had issued an execution against a judgment debtor without giving a bill of particulars of the costs.
The debtor went to the justice's office and made some
slighting remarks while the justice was preparing the bill
of costs. The court in holding that the justice of the peace
could not punish the debtor for contempt, explained that
the justice could only punish in this way when he was acting judicially and not ministerially. It is to be noted that
the case was not pending before the justice as judgment
had already been rendered. Hence, the words used did not
tend to obstruct the administration of justice. The rule is
that a remark to be a contempt of court must be one tending toward an interference with justice in a case pending
before the court.7 Lastly, there is a case8 in which the
judge, who had issued an execution on certain property,
seized it and proceeded to sell the same as "ex-officio" sheriff. While engaged in the auction sale, the judge deemed
himself insulted by a bystander. He thereupon fined and
imprisoned the person offending his dignity. The appellate
court held that the defendant was not guilty of contempt.
Here also, since execution had issued on the judgment, the
judicial duties were ended.
Obviously, none of these cases bear out the above mentioned contention. They are cited to show that sometimes
the courts have distinguished between judicial functions
and other functions of a court in contempt cases. But it
appears that when a court acts ministerially it is not acting
Stokely v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. Cas. 330; 15 Ann. Cas. 659.
6 Fitler v. Probasco, 2 Browne (Pa.) 137; 15 Ann. Cas. 659.
7 Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Atty. Genl, 205 U. S. 454, 463 (1007). "Contempt"
18 C. J. §2, n. 2, p. 5.
8 Detournion v. Dormenon, 1 Mart. (La.) 136, 15 Ann. Cas. 659 (1810).
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as a court. The cases examined do not attempt to differentiate judicial and administrative duties of the court when it
is acting as such.
On the other hand, the authority is to the effect that any
interference with property in the hands of a receiver, without leave of court, or any criticism within the rule 9 directed
toward the judge accusing him of bias or prejudice, is a
contempt of court.10 If the essential elements of contempt
(as required by the Judicial Code) had been present in the
Craig Case, supra, the appellate court would probably have
sustained the judgment below.
Is, then, the contention sound on principle? It is believed
that it would be impractical to draw a line between administrative and judicial functions in a case involving a receivership. Court supervision, apparently, is necessary to
protect the rights of all parties at every stage in the proceedings. In this respect, a judge passing on the management of a business in the hands of a receiver differs in no
practical way from a judge presiding in a trial between two
individuals. Moreover, if such a distinction should be made
between the two duties, confusion must inevitably arise.
It would be exceedingly difficult to make a rule applicable
to all cases. The judge, consequently, would be hampered
in his work, and thereby would be rendered less efficient.
-H. F. PORTERFIELD.

PARTITION-JURISDICTION OF EQUITY COURT TO DETERMINE

QUESTION OF TITLE ARISING THEREIN.-Section 1, Chapter 79
of the WEST VIRGINIA CODE provides that "Tenants in common, joint tenants and co-parceners shall be compellable to
make partition, and the circuit court of the county wherein
the land lies shall have jurisdiction of partition, and in the
exercise of such may take cognizance of all questions of
law affecting the legal title that may arise in any proceeding." This statute does not indicate whether the proceedO Supra, n. 7.
10

Kneisel v. Ursus Motor Co., 316 Ill. 336; 147 N. E. 243; 39 A. L. R. 1 (1925).
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